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ABSTRACT

Recently in Korea, certain issues of corporatelaw became the
subjects of fierce politicaldebates unlike many otherjurisdictions
where corporate law issues generally remain in the exclusive
realm of professionals and academics. This Article begins with
the question of why corporate law issues attracted so much
political attention in Korea and whether such political attention

actually helped improve the corporate law. In pursuing the
answers to such questions, this Article identifies a recurring

pattern: (i) existence of strict rules against seeking private
benefits; (ii) various clever measures to circumvent such rules;
(iii)failure of the courts to regulate such circumventing measures;
(iv) many proposals for new statutes in the legislature, which
often become politicized and lead to suboptimal results; and (v)
the stricter new rules that prompt another round of

circumvention.
This pattern of "rules-circumvention-passivejudiciarystricter statutory rules-further circumvention" is most salient
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when the controlling shareholders attempt to implement
"management succession" (i.e., transferring ownership and

managerialpower to the descendants of the controlling family).
This Article analyzes a few measures widely used in Korea for
management succession: issuing stock at a low price, selling

treasury stock at a low price, "funneling"of business, "tolling,"
and conducting horizontal spin-offs. While some of these
measures fall under the typical category of tunneling, some are
dubious. By tracking the chain of actions (by the corporationsand
the controlling family members) and reactions (by the
government, including the executive, judiciary, and legislative

branches) along the line of the foregoing pattern, this Article
shows the importance of the judiciary'srole in corporatelaw and
the limitation of the political lawmaking process in corporate

law. The stories involving management succession in Korea also
show that the rules, being vulnerable to circumvention, cannot

effectively address the corporategovernanceproblems without the
concurrentapplicationof the standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law is usually an area of interest for professionals and
academics. It is unusual that politicians and the media pay serious
attention to the typical issues of corporate law. In Korea, however,
certain corporate law issues have been heavily debated in the political
arena. For example, in the presidential election of 2012, major
candidates promised to implement "corporate law reforms" such as
"multiple derivative action," "mandatory cumulative vote," and
"separation of the board chair and CEO" by amending the Korean
Commercial Code (KCC).1 These items appeared in the campaign
leaflets of major candidates as their campaign promises, but they failed
to develop into statutes during the presidency of Park Geun-Hye, who
won the 2012 election.2 However, bills in a similar vein began to be
submitted by various congress members in 2016 and similar campaign

promises were made again in the presidential election of 2017 by both
3
conservative and progressive candidates. As of December 2019, fortyfive bills proposed by congress members from various parties are

pending at the National Assembly for the amendment of the KCC
regarding corporate governance issues. 4
Why are corporate law issues so political in Korea? Is it good that
corporate law issues are discussed at the legislature and made into
statutes? These were the initial questions that prompted this research.
In an attempt to answer these questions, the author found a recurring
pattern: (i) existence of current rules, (ii) circumvention of the rules,
(iii) passivity of the judiciary, (iv) new statutes that provide stricter
rules, and (v) further circumvention.
To elaborate on the foregoing pattern, managers and controlling
shareholders of Korean corporations often seek private benefits like
those in other jurisdictions. 5 Korean law, like the laws of other

Sangbeob [Korean Commercial Code], Act No. 1000, amended by Act No.
1.
15755 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter KCC]. It is composed of six chapters, including Chapter 3:
Corporation.

After Park Geun-Hye, the conservative candidate, took the presidency in
2.
2013, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) drafted a bill in accordance with her campaign
promises. However, many major conservative newspapers severely criticized and
demanded withdrawal of the bill through their seemingly coordinated editorials, some of
which blamed the bill as a "leftist attack on Korean companies." Within a week from the
publication of these editorials, the President invited the "Chairs" of major Korean
chaebols to the Presidential House and promised that the government will be "cautious"
in amending the KCC. Soon the MOJ virtually suspended any more work on this issue,
but the issues were revived in 2016.
Kyung-Hoon Chun, Hoesa-beob Gae-jeong-an-e Gwan-han Bun-seok-gwa
3.
Pyeong-ga [Analyses and Evaluationsof the Amendment Bills on Korean CorporateLaw],
30 GYEONG-YEONG-BEOB-RYUL [J. Bus. ADMIN. & L.] 1, 33 (2019) (S. Kor.).
Id. at 3-6 (providing the list of all forty-five bills in Korean).
4.
See, e.g., infra Parts IIIA, IVA.
5.
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jurisdictions, provides strict rules that prohibit or penalize seeking
private benefits. 6 Rather than engaging in an outright violation of
such rules, the managers and controlling shareholders often come up
with various clever measures to circumvent the rules.7 When a case is
brought in front of the court, however, Korean courts tend to take a
conservative and formalistic approach in interpreting corporate law,
and often fail to regulate circumventions. 8 Such passivity of the
judiciary prompts the need for new statutes and often leads to
statutory amendment proposals in the legislature.9 Processes at the

legislature tend to become politicized and usually end with suboptimal
results. 10 If stricter new rules are established, another round of
circumvention occurs."
Such a pattern is most salient when the controlling shareholders
attempt to implement "management succession" (i.e., transferring the
ownership of the controlling block of shares and the de facto
managerial power to the next generation member of the controlling
family). Effective management succession is becoming a more and

more serious issue among Korean companies in the presence of a few
factors: a deeply rooted culture of owner management in many Korean
companies, the aging of the controlling members of many Korean
companies, and a high rate of inheritance tax (50 percent).
The purpose of this Article is to identify and examine the foregoing
pattern in the context of management succession in Korean companies
and to assess whether such a pattern contributed to improving
corporate law. Tracking the chain of actions (by the corporations and
the controlling family members) and reactions (by the government,
including the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches) along the
line of the foregoing pattern reveals the importance of the judiciary's
role and the limitation of the political lawmaking process in corporate
law. The stories involving management succession in Korea also show
that the rules, often vulnerable to circumvention, cannot effectively
address the corporate governance problems without the concurrent
application of the standards.
Part II provides a general background as to why management
succession became an important issue in Korea. The following chapters
analyze a few representative cases: Part III examines the so-called
cheap stock tunneling, Part IV the related party transactions, and Part
V the horizontal corporate divisions. Part VI concludes the discussion.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See,
See,
See,
See,
See,
See,

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

infra Parts IILB, IV.B.
infra Parts II C, I D, IV.C.1, IV.D.
infra Parts IIIC, IILD, IV.C2, IV.D.
infra Parts III.C, III.D, IV.C.3, IV.D.
infra Parts IIIC, III.D, IV.C.3, IMD.
infra Part IV.C.4.
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II. BACKGROUND FOR MANAGEMENT SUCCESSION
In Korea, a number of large business groups, commonly known as

chaebols, dominate the corporate scene. 1 2 Chaebol refers to a large
group of related corporations engaged in diverse lines of business
under highly concentrated family or individual control. 13 Large

chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai Motors, LG, SK, Lotte, Hanwha,
and Doosan have played a crucial role in Korea's economic development
and still represent a critical portion of the Korean economy in terms of
14
Usually, a few large
revenues, exports, hiring, patents, and so forth.
companies within the group are listed on the stock market, but many
other affiliates remain unlisted. The controlling family members'
shareholding ratio in the listed flagship companies of each group is
usually far less than 50 percent, which creates a typical problem of
15
"controlling minority shareholders."
In most cases, the controlling shareholder holds a title such as
Chair or Honorary Chair and exercises control over the management
of the entire group, either as a board member (and the CEO) or as a de

facto or shadow director who is not officially a member of the board
elected at the shareholders' meeting. In other words, the controlling
shareholders of Korean chaebols are, in most cases, not just passive
investors but the heads of the management who have the ultimate
power to make important business decisions and to hire and fire senior
members of the management.1
Most chaebols started in the early or mid-twentieth century as
small family-run enterprises and grew rapidly in the late twentieth
century. 17 Most of their founders have already passed away, and
currently, their second (or third or even fourth, in the case of the aged

chaebols) generation is in power. 1 8 As the current "Chairs" become

Kyung-Hoon Chun, Multiple Derivative Actions: Debates in Korea and the
12.
Implication for a Comparative Study, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L. 306, 314 (2019).
Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate
13.
Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
61, 63-64 (1999).
ECONOMIC REFORM RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CHAEBOL-EUI GYEONO-JE-RYEOK
14.

JIP-JUNG [CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER BY CHAEBOLS] 7-10 (asset), 13-14
(revenue), 22-25 (hiring) (2018) (S. Kor.).
Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidoscope
15.
of Corporate Governance Reform in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAW & POIY INT'L Bus. 183, 196-

202 (2002).
Id. at 202-03.
16.
See Wonhyuk Lim, The Emergence of the Chaebol and the Origins of the
17.
Chaebol Problem, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA 35,
39-40 (Stephan Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim & Euysung Kim eds., 2003).
E.g., the founder of Samsung Group, Byung-Chul Lee, died in 1987 and his
18.
grandson, Jae-Yong Lee, is the current leader of the group; the founder of Hyundai
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aged, the chaebols are confronting serious questions of management
succession: To whom should they pass the ownership and the
managerial power? How should they implement the management
succession?
In this regard, an important factor is the high rate of inheritance
tax in Korea. Under the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act, the inheritance
tax is levied at 50 percent of the tax base (the fair value of inherited
assets, with certain deductions and add-ups) for the portion exceeding

KRW 3 billion (approximately USD 2.8 million).19 As for the shares of
a firm, the fair value is calculated based on the recent market price (for
listed shares) or pursuant to a certain prescribed formula designed to
reflect the firm's earning value and asset value (for unlisted shares).2 0
In addition, for both listed and unlisted shares, a control premium is
added up to produce the tax base if the inherited shares constitute the
largest block.21 For example, if an heir inherits more than half of the
total shares of a firm, the tax base is 120 percent of the fair value of
the inherited shares.
Thus, unless the successor has sufficient funds, the successor will
have to sell at least a part of the controlling block in order to pay such
a large amount of inheritance tax. Then the family is likely to lose
control over the entire group and this will totally change the corporate
scene of Korea. Would it be good for the company and the Korean
economy as a whole?
There are conflicting voices regarding this question. Some argue
that Korea still needs to maintain entrepreneurial leadership of
chaebols within the controlling family. 22 They praise the owner-

manager's strong incentive for long-term profits and the aggressive
initiative that professional managers often lack.23 Thus, they support
such ideas as no inheritance tax, dual class shares, and tenure voting
to maintain the family's control. 24 Others argue that the Korean
economy cannot trust the spoiled children of the chaebol families

Group, Ju-Yung Chung, died in 2001, and his grandson, Eui-Sun Chung, is the current
leader of Hyundai Motor Group (a major spin-off from the old Hyundai Group).
19.
Sang-sok-se-mit-jeung-yeo-se-beob [Inheritance and Gift Tax Act], Act No
114, amended by Act No. 16846 (S. Kor.).
20.
Id. at art. 63.
21.
Id. The control premium is 20 percent for the largest shareholder of a
corporation and its specially related persons. Id.
22.
See Choi Jong Hee, Interview with Prof. Dong-Geun Cho, NEW DAILY (Sept.
10,
2015),
http://biz.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2015/09/10/20 150910 10122.html
[https://perma.cc/L5P4-GFAB] (archived Feb. 16, 2020).
23.
See id. (citing to Ford, BMW, and Volkswagen as examples that family
management can improve decision-making).
24,
See, e.g., Korea Enterprises Federation, an influential association of
businesses in Korea, submitted an opinion to the government in December 2018 with
respect to the bills pending at the legislature. It proposed that the government lower
inheritance tax, allow dual class shares, and restrict hostile acquisitions.
https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html dir/2018/12/09/2018120900621.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8ZJ-LHTT] (archived Feb. 16, 2020).
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anymore. 25 They identify family control as a serious risk factor and
believe that the chaebol companies and the Korean economy as a whole
26
Thus, some of them
have outgrown the size fit for family control
27
while others support
argue for stronger regulations on chaebols,
more exposure of chaebol companies to the pressure of the capital
28
market and even the market for corporate control.
It is a fundamental debate, but in any event, quite naturally, the

chaebol families do not want to lose their control. For the chaebol
families, it is imperative to increase the potential successors'
shareholding ratios in advance and earn them as much cash as possible
to pay the inheritance tax without having to sell the shares. This is
why so many clever measures were invented for management
succession. Some of such measures are classic forms of tunneling, but
some are not clearly so. 2 9 From the following examples, a pattern can
be identified: strict rules, circumvention, judiciary passivity, statutory
amendment, and further circumvention.

III. LOW PRICE STOCK ISSUANCE TO THE POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR

A. Previous Practices
The most typical way for management succession is to issue large
amounts of shares to the next generation member of the controlling
family (hereinafter "N") at a low price. This will increase N's
shareholding ratio and transfer wealth from the other shareholders to
N. Figure 1 shows the typical flow: the controlling shareholder
somehow causes Company B, the flagship listed company of the group,
to issue new shares at a low price to N or Company A owned by N. N

In a family corporation where the children of a parent-controller compete to
25.
become the successor, children have an incentive to take on suboptimal projects by way
of inefficient risk-taking, particularly when they have a small fraction of ownership in
the corporation. E.g., Sang Yop Kang; "Game of Thrones": Corporate Governance Issues
of Children's Competition in Family Corporations, 15 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 186, 186
(2018).
For a detailed discussion, see SANG-IN PARK, WAE Ji-GEUM CHAEBOL GAE26.
HYEOK-IN-GA? [WHY CHAEBOL REFORM Now?] 82-104 (2017).
Id. at 189-208.
27.
The author believes that one of the motivations that led to adopting the
28.
Korean version of Stewardship Code in 2016 was to increase market pressure on
chaebols.
"TIunneling" is defined as the "transferof resources out of a company to its
29.
controlling shareholder (who is typically also a top manager)." See Simon Johnson et al.,
Tunneling, 90 AM. EcON. REv. 22, 22 (2000). Some literatures use this term to also
include "transfers to managers who are not controllers." See Vladimir Atanasov et al.,
Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2011). Tunneling can be divided into three basic
types: cash flow tunneling, asset tunneling, and equity tunneling. Id. at 5-9.
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will, directly or through Company A, end up having larger shares in
Company B by sacrificing the noncontrolling shareholders of Company

B.
Figure

1
Contro lng

Dispersed

Shareholder

Noncontrolling

Shareholders
Next Generation

20%

Members ("N")8%
100%

Company B
Company A

(closed)

Company B issues new
shares or CB/BWs at a
low price

ed)

B. Rules
Korean law, however, is very strict on this matter, Since the
issuance of new shares to a third party is likely to dilute the existing
shareholders' rights, the KCC grants the existing shareholders
preemptive rights. Under Article 418 of the KCC, each shareholder of
a corporation has a preemptive right to subscribe to new shares in

proportion to its shareholding

30

Third-party allotment of new shares

is allowed only when it is (i) permitted by the articles of incorporation
and (ii) necessary to attain a proper business purpose, such as
"introduction of new technology or improvement of financial

structure."31
The first requirement is not an important issue, because most
companies have provisions in their articles of incorporation restricting
the existing shareholders' preemptive rights.32 However, the second
requirement is strict in itself and, moreover, is quite narrowly
interpreted by the courts. The Supreme Court even held that a defense
against a hostile takeover does not constitute a proper business
purpose and that the new shares issued to a third party who was
friendly to the incumbent management were null and void. 33
Convertible bonds (CBs) and bonds with warrant (BWs) are subject to

30.
31.

KCC art. 418.
Id.

32.
See KOREA LISTED CORPORATIONS ASSOCIATION, SANG-JANG HOESA PYO-JUN
JEONG-GWAN [STANDARD ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION FOR LISTED CORPORATIONS] art.
10 (2019) (most listed firms in Korea use this as a basis of their articles of incorporation).
33.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Da50776, Jan. 30, 2009 (S. Kor.).
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4
similar rules under the KCC.3 In a few cases, those issuing CBs (with
a low conversion price) or BWs (with a low exercise price) to a third
35
party were found guilty of criminal breach of trust against the issuer.
Thus, issuance of new shares to N or Company A in the above case is

likely to be found illegal and prohibited,

and even criminally

punishable if the price is lower than the fair price. Thus, companies
had to come up with a circumventive measure.

C. Circumvention #1: Forfeited Shares
The first measure is reissuing forfeited shares. Company B (of
Figure 1) launches a rights issue of new shares at a low price to the
existing shareholders. Certain shareholders do not exercise their
preemptive rights to buy new shares, and thus, their rights are
"forfeited." Then, the board of Company B reissues the forfeited shares
to N or Company A at the original issue price (which is lower than the
fair price). The end result is the same as in Figure 1, except that some
smart and diligent shareholders may have exercised their preemptive
rights and shared this good opportunity with N or Company A. In
reality, many shareholders tend to remain inert in exercising their
preemptive rights and some shareholders specially related to the
controlling family voluntarily give up their rights. 36 Thus, this
measure was quite popular.

However, it faced a serious challenge by prosecutors in the
Everland case. Everland was a nonlisted, de facto holding company of
Samsung Group, held by members of the Lee family and their affiliate

companies.3 7 In 1996, Everland decided to issue to its shareholders
CBs that were convertible into common shares of Everland at a price
38
Of the
lower than the fair market value of the Everland shares.
existing shares, 97 percent gave up their preemptive rights, and the
board of Everland reissued the forfeited 97 percent CBs to JY Lee, the
39
Later, JY Lee realized huge
son of the controlling shareholder.
profits by converting the CBs into shares and having them listed on
the stock exchange. 40 In 2006, Everland's directors were indicted for

See KCC arts. 513(3) (for CBs), 516-2(4) (for BWs).
34.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do9436, May 29, 2009 (S. Kor.) (for BWs);
35.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Do3191, Sept. 28, 2001 (S. Kor.) (for CBs).
See, e.g., the underlying facts of Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2011Da57869, Sept.
36.
12, 2013 (S. Kor.); infra notes 37, 48.
Supreme Court [S, Ct.], 2007Do4949, May 29, 2009 (S. Kor.).
37.
38.
Id.
39.

Id.

40.

Id.
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criminal breach of trust on the ground that they breached their
fiduciary duty towards Everland by reissuing the CBs at a low price. 4
In the Supreme Court, the opinions were split. Both the majority
and the minority opinions agreed that (i) a low issue price does not
matter in the case of a rights issue and (ii) a low issue price is
problematic in the case of a third-party allotment. 4 2 The minority
opinion identified this case as a third-party allotment because 97
percent of the existing shareholders gave up their preemptive rights
and Everland practically reissued most of the CBs to a single third
party. 43 The majority opinion, however, ruled that this case still
qualified as a rights issue because the opportunity to buy the CBs on
favorable terms (i.e., a low conversion price) was given to all the
existing shareholders and they voluntarily gave up their rights.44
According to the majority opinion, the defendants were found not guilty
of a criminal breach of trust.4 5

Many people perceived that the court avowedly sided with the
chaebol and gave a wholesale blessing to the use of forfeited shares. 6
Such perception, however, is not entirely correct. In the Everland case,
as the directors of Everland (i.e., the issuer) were indicted for criminal
breach of trust owed to Everland, the issue was whether Everland
suffered damage due to the misconduct of its directors. 47 But the
economic substance of this case shows that it is not Everland but the
97 percent shareholders that suffered any damage, because the wealth
was transferred from the 97 percent shareholders of Everland to JY

Lee. Indeed, shareholders of Cheil Industries, one of the 97 percent
shareholders of Everland, filed a derivative action against the directors
of Cheil Industry. 4 8 Their cause of action was that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty towards Cheil Industry by wrongfully
giving up its preemptive right to buy Everland's CBs at advantageous

terms.4 9 The court supported the plaintiffs' claim. 50 In sum, although
the Everland ruling held that the issuer's directors were not guilty, it

41.
Id.
Id.
42.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
E.g., Seung-Hyun Cho, Sam-sung-eui In-jeok Ji-bae-gu-joByeon-hwa-wa Geu
Beob-jeok Mun-je-jeom [Legal Issues of the Change in the Governance Structure of
Samsung], 67 MIN-JU-BEOB-HAK [DEMOCRATIC LEGAL STUD.] 191, 206 (2018) (S. Kor.).
47.
The criminal breach of trust requires damage suffered by the person to whom
the defendant owes a fiduciary duty. Hyeongbeob [Criminal Code], Act No. 293, amended
by Act No. 15982, art. 355(2) (S. Kor.). A director owes fiduciary duty to the corporation
rather than to the shareholders. KCC art. 382(2). Thus, damage suffered by the
corporation is an element of the criminal breach of trust.
48.
Daegu High Court [Daegu High Ct.], 2011Na2372, Aug. 22, 2012 (S. Kor.).
Id.
49.
50.
Id.
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did not necessarily mean that the whole scheme was justifiable and
legitimate.
In any event, the Everland ruling showed (or at least created the
impression) that current rules were insufficient to block a similar deal.
Keen on the antipathy of the general public against chaebols, the
government and the National Assembly amended the statute to

address this problem. 5 1 According to the amendment, once an existing
shareholder gives up its preemptive rights in the rights issue of a listed
firm, such forfeited portion may be reissued only at a fair market price

as if it were a third-party allotment. 52 This amendment does not apply
to a nonlisted firm such as Everland.
In sum, the judiciary was reluctant to regulate this circumvention
and the Everland ruling was perceived by outsiders as having granted
blessing to this circumventing practice. The legislative reaction was
quick, but incomplete in scope.

D. Circumvention #2: Use of Treasury Stock
Another measure to circumvent the strict requirements of Article
418 of the KCC is to sell treasury shares in lieu of issuing new shares.
In the past, Korean law prohibited a company's acquisition of its
53
Shares
own shares unless it met certain criteria for an exception.

exceptionally acquired by the issuer had to be cancelled or disposed of
55
4
the KCC
within a reasonable time.5 Through the 2011 amendment,
now allows acquisition by a company of its own shares to the extent
that it does not impair the distributable earning of the company and
56
It
that it does not infringe on the equal treatment of shareholders.

also allows a company to keep treasury shares, without needing to
cancel or dispose of them.5 7 The shares owned by the issuer, however,
do not have voting rights, 58 and most commentators agree that such
59
In sum, the shares bought back
shares are not entitled to dividends.
by the issuer exist as treasury shares without voting rights and rights

51.

Amendment to the Ja-bon-shi-jang-gwa Geum-yung-tu-ja-eob-e Gwan-han

Beob-ryul

[Financial Investment and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013,
art. 165-6(2) (S. Kor.).
Id. There are several exceptions to this rule. Id.
52.
The most important exception was that a listed company could buy its own
53.
shares on the market to the extent that its distributable earnings (defined in KCC art.
462) are not impaired. Jeung-gwon-geo-rae-beob [Securities Exchange Act], Act No. 972,
amended by Act No. 8985, art.189-2 (before the 2009 abolishment).
KCC art. 341 (before the 2011 amendment).
54.
Act No. 10600, Apr. 14, 2011 (S. Kor.).
55.
KCC art. 341.
56.

57.

Id.

58.
59.

KCC art. 369(2),
See, e.g., KoNSIK KIM ET AL., HOESA-BEOB [CORPORATE LAW] 660 (2018).
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to dividends. The company may cancel such treasury shares or utilize
them for other purposes, such as stock options or in-kind dividends, or
instead sell them to a third party.

In terms of economic effects, selling treasury shares and issuing
new shares are the same: both the number of votes and the assets of
the company increase. Thus, the underlying rationale for granting
preemptive rights to the existing shareholders should apply. However,
the KCC does not clearly extend the preemptive rights of the existing
shareholders to the sale of treasury shares-KCC only provides that

the board of directors may decide to sell treasury shares, with
determination of such details as the number of shares to be sold, the
buyer, the price, the payment date, and the manner of sale. 60 It does
not mention the preemptive rights of the existing shareholders or other
requirements similar to Article 418.
Courts are also reluctant to regulate the sale of treasury shares.
There was at least one trial court ruling that invalidated the sale of
treasury shares based on the analogous application of the rules on the
issuance of new shares,6 1 but it was rather an exception. Although
there is not yet a Supreme Court decision on this point, many decisions
of the trial courts or the appellate courts have held that the rules on
the issuance of new shares were not directly or analogously applicable
to the sale of treasury shares.6 2 Of course, the sale of treasury shares
is subject to the general fiduciary duty of the directors of the issuer,
but courts have been very passive in articulating and enforcing
fiduciary duty in this context. 63 Therefore, a sale of treasury shares
has become one of the most common methods to neutralize hostile
takeover attempts or activists' interference and to increase N's
shareholding.
Why are Korean courts and many lawyers reluctant to apply the
rules on issuing new shares to the sale of treasury shares in spite of
their economic similarity? First, the general tendency of Korean
jurisprudence toward textualism may be one reason. Deeply influenced
by civil law tradition (especially the code system of German law), the
legal system of Korea is composed of hundreds of statutes made by the

legislature.6 4 The judiciary is expected to interpret the statutes rather

60.
KCC art. 342.
61.
Seoul Western District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2005Gahap8262, June 29, 2006 (S.
Kor.).
62.
E.g., Seoul Northern District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2007Kahap1082, Oct. 25,
2007 (S. Kor.); Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2015Kahap80597, July 7, 2015
(S. Kor.).
63.
E.g., Seoul Northern District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2007Kahap1082, Oct. 25,
2007 (S. Kor.); Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2015Kahap80597, July 7, 2015
(S. Kor.).
64.
According to the website of the Ministry of Government Legislation of Korea,
the number of effective statutes as of January 16, 2020 is 1,848 See MINISTRY OF
GOVERNMENT
LEGISLATION
OF
KOREA,
EFFECTIVE
STATUTES
(2020),
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than create law. 65 Under such tradition, one tends to believe that any
reform should be done by amending the statutes rather than by
actively interpreting the existing ones. Second, there is a reasonable
observation that the requirements under Article 418 are too strict.
Companies often buy and sell their own shares on the stock exchange

out of proper financial needs 6 6 If the draconian approach of Article
418 is applied per se to every sale of treasury shares, the financial
67
Third, the absence
flexibility of companies will be unduly restricted.
of poison pills and dual class shares under Korean law strengthened
the belief that a sale of treasury shares should be freely allowed as a
defense measure against a hostile takeover. According to the prevailing
view, a United States-style poison pill is not allowed under the current
Korean law because it is against the doctrine of equal treatment of
shareholders. 68 A bill that specifically allowed a poison pill was
drafted and put on public notice by the Ministry of Justice in 200969
0
but failed to be made into a statute. 7 Dual class shares or golden
shares are not allowed because the KCC clearly declares the doctrine
of "one share, one vote." 7 1 Thus, the use of treasury shares as a defense
measure gained popularity and some legitimacy.
However, a number of legal experts thought that, given the
similarity in economic nature, the sale of treasury shares should be
treated equally or at least similarly with the issuance of new shares,
2
by amending the KCC (if not by interpreting it).7 A draft amendment
to the KCC put on public notice in 2006 by the MOJ included a
provision that Article 418 shall be applied mutatis mutandis to the sale
of treasury shares. 7 That provision failed to survive in the final
74
but a few bills in a similar vein were
version of the 2011 amendment,
submitted by the congress members of the current ruling party (known

https://www.moleg.go.kr/english/ [https://perma.ce/33X4-SDZW] (archived Mar. 18,
2020)
Dachanmingook Heonbeob [Constitution] art. 103 (S. Kor.).
65.
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 625-631 (1986) (analyzing reasons for
66.
repurchasing the corporation's own shares); JAMES D COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW 494-95 (4th ed. 2016) (stating that sale of treasury
shares is allowed even at less than par value).
KIM ET AL., supra note 59, at 661.
67.
68.
Kim, supra note 13, at 77 n.80.
Ministry of Justice of Korea, Preliminary Notice for (Draft) Amendment to
69.
the KCC (Dec. 1, 2009) (MOJ Public Notice 2009-171) (in Korean).
70.
Currently, 3 bills that propose the adoption of a poison pill are pending at
the National Assembly: Bill No. 3598, Nov. 15, 2016, Bill No. 9977, Nov. 1, 2017, and Bill
No. 13575, May 15, 2018.
KCC art. 369(1).
71.
72.
KIM ET AL., supra note 59, at 661.
Ministry of Justice of Korea, Preliminary Notice for (Draft) Amendment to
73.
the KCC (Oct. 4, 2006) (MOJ Public Notice 2006-106) (in Korean).
Supra note 55.
74.
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as progressive) in 2016.75 As a modified proposal, the recommendation
draft made by a special advisory committee for the MOJ in 2017 not
only extended the rules on issuing new shares to the sale of treasury
shares but also provided a market exception under which the company
may sell its treasury shares on the exchange up to 5 percent of its net
assets per year without triggering the preemptive rights of
shareholders and other complex procedures for issuing new shares. 76
The current opposition party (known as conservative) and
business communities are generally against these proposals.7 7 There
is even an argument by a conservative but influential legal scholar that
treasury shares should be deemed an asset of the company, and, thus,
the sale of treasury shares should be free of any regulation. 78 A
number of media articles, columns, and editorials argue that sale of
treasury shares should not be restricted until effective defensive
measures against hostile takeover are introduced by statutes. 79 As of
March 2020, while the foregoing bills are still pending, no substantive
discussions are going on within the National Assembly.
In sum, the courts not only failed to regulate but almost supported
the use of treasury shares in lieu of issuing new shares. The legislative
reaction, albeit timely launched, faced strong opposition and has not
been effective to date.

IV. TUNNELING THROUGH RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
A. PreviousPractices
For an effective and stable management succession, N needs
sufficient money to buy more shares in case of any threat to its control
and to pay various taxes, in particular the inheritance tax. The most
typical way to secure cash for N is engaging in related party

75.
76.
77.

Bill No. 106, June 7, 2016 (S. Kor.); Bill No. 3952, Nov. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.).
This recommendation draft was not made publicly available.
See, e.g., news articles cited in infra note 79.
78.
JUN-SEON CHOI, HOESA-BEOB [CORPORATE LAW] 314-15 (2017). In the US,
such "asset theory" existed in the early 20th century. See PROSPER REITER JR., PROFITS,
DIvIDENDS AND THE LAW 238 (1926). Currently, no serious scholar of accounting or
corporate law supports asset theory in the US or Europe anymore.
79.
The English translation of the titles of some of those media articles may
convey the general atmosphere. See generally Jang Eun-ji, Revision to Commercial Law
Amendment: Restrictions on Treasury Stock Disposal? What About Defense of
Management Rights, NEWS ONE (Feb. 15, 2017), http://newsl.kr/articles/?2912910
[https://perma.cc/LPN8-BJN5] (archived Feb. 16, 2020); Kim Ik-hwan, Listed Firms with
Treasury Stock Become Targets for Activist Hedge Funds, KOREA ECON. DAILY (Oct. 13,
2017),
https://www.hankyung.com/finance/article/2017101309201
[https://perma.cc/8R7L-7V7U] (archived Feb. 16, 2020); Foreign Speculative Capital
Raids Are Raised . . Hurry Legislation "ManagementShield", DONO-A ILBO (May 18,
2018),
http://www.donga com/news/home/article/all/20180518/90136352/1
[https://perma.cc/8UEH-FUUJ] (archived Feb. 16, 2020).
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transactions, the most typical form of tunneling. Figure 2 shows the
typical example. Company B is a listed flagship company of the
business group, and Company A is a closed company owned by N. The
controlling family owns 20 percent of the total shares of Company B
but somehow controls it as a controlling-minority shareholder. If
Company A and Company B enter into a transaction (e.g., sale of
assets, securities, and services) under terms advantageous for
Company A, then the wealth is transferred from Company B to
Company A, ultimately from the noncontrolling shareholders of
Company B to N. N will, directly or through Company A, end up having
more cash or cash equivalents by sacrificing the noncontrolling
shareholders of Company B.

Figure 2

Dispersed

Noncontrolling
Shareholders

Next Generation

Members
("N"s)
100%

c pandA

80%

20%

Company B
(listed)

B. Rules
Korean law prohibits or penalizes such an outright tunneling in

various ways.
First, directors who executed or approved a transaction
disadvantageous to Company B may be held liable toward Company B,
either through a derivative action brought by the shareholders of
81
for their
Company B 8 or a direct suit brought by Company B,
breach of fiduciary duty. The general perception in Korea, however, is
that civil actions generally pose less threat to the directors and
managers of a company than the administrative and criminal
sanctions discussed below, due to a lack of plaintiff-friendly

80.
81.

KCC art. 403.
Id. at art. 399
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mechanisms such as discovery systems, punitive damages, and class
actions.

Second, Article 23(1)(vii) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair
Trade Law (FTL), 82 the main statute regulating chaebols, prohibits
"undue support" between affiliate companies.8 3 More specifically, it
prohibits "unduly supporting a specially related party or another
company through ... providing advanced payments, loans, manpower,
real estate, commercial notes, goods, services, intangible property, etc.,
to a specially related party or another company, or transactingon terms

considerably advantageous for them [emphasis added]."

84

Article

23(1)(vii) does not limit its scope to transactions between affiliate
companies within a large business group, but in practice it has
primarily been enforced against tunneling that occurred at chaebols.85
Thus, roughly speaking, any intragroup transactions that are not on
arms-length terms may constitute undue support. Violation of Article
23(1)(vii) is subject to a cease and desist order, 6 administrative fine
(gwa-jing-geum, often translated into "surcharge") up to 5 percent of
the related revenue, 87 and/or criminal penalty of up to three-years'
imprisonment 8 8 The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), the main
competition authority of Korea, has been active in enforcing the undue
89
support clause, adjudicating many cases for the last two decades.
Third, an unfair related party transaction may constitute
"criminal breach of trust," or baeim in Korean. 90 Pursuant to the
Korean Criminal Code and the special statutes, if a person taking care
of another person's affairs breaches his duties and causes harm to such
a person through obtaining (or causing a third party to obtain)
unlawful profits, he will be subject to criminal fine or imprisonment,

Dok-jeom Gyu-je-mit Gong-jeong Geo-rae-e Gwan-han Beob-ryul [Monopoly
82.
Regulation and Fair Trade Law], Act No. 3320, amended by Act No. 15784 (S. Kor.)
(hereinafter FTL).
83.
Article 23 of the FTL addresses "unfair trade practices." Paragraph (1) of this
Article lists seven specific types of unfair trade practices and the seventh is "undue
support." The undue support clause was introduced to the FTL on December 30, 1996
(effective as of April 1, 1997). The stated primary legislative goal of this clause was to
control economic concentration, and the corporate governance aspects of "undue support"
(such as harm to creditors and minority shareholders) were not explicitly mentioned or
discussed in the legislative documents. Yong Lim & Geeyoung Min, Competition and
Corporate Governance: Teaming Up to Police Tunneling, 36 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 267,
276-77 (2016).
FTL art. 23(1)(vii).
84.
85.
Lim & Min, supra note 83, at 273.
FTL art. 24.
86.
87.
Id. at art. 24-2. Originally, it was imposed on the party that made the undue
support, not the party that received it. After the amendment in 2013, the party that
received the undue support is also subject to the monetary penalty. Id.
88.
Id. at art. 66(1)(ix-2).
89.
The number of undue support cases adjudicated by the KFTC from 1998 to
2018 was 168. See KFTC, 2018 NYEON-DO TONG-GYE YEON-BO 66 [STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF 2018] (2019).
90.
See supra note 47.
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which may be extended to lifetime imprisonment depending on the
91
amount of the unlawful profit. The elements of criminal breach of
trust are: (i) breach of duty, (ii) by a person who is taking care of
another person's affairs, (iii) loss to such other person, and (iv) profit
92
In Figure 2, directors or managers of
to the actor or a third party.
Company B breached their fiduciary duty by engaging in transactions
disadvantageous to Company B and advantageous to Company A. Such
a breach in the context of intragroup transactions was held by the court
to constitute criminal breach of trust.9 3 Given the severity of penalties,
criminal breach of trust has been a strong threat to those who
attempted to obtain personal gains through related party transactions.

C. Circumvention #1: Funnelingof Business
1. New Practices
One measure designed to avoid the application of the undue
support clause (and probably the criminal breach of trust) is the so-

called ilgam morajugi in Korean, or "funneling of business."

94

It can

be roughly defined as an exclusive or large volume of intragroup
transactions, which intend to transfer wealth to the controlling
shareholders and their related persons. 95 In Korea, member

companies

of business

groups

often enter

into

exclusive

or

semiexclusive contracts with other member companies to outsource
various services, such as information technology, advertisement,
building
management,
transportation,
small
construction,
maintenance, and repair. 96
Assume that Company A, an IT service company within Group X,
makes most of its revenue by providing IT services to other group
companies including Company B, the listed flagship company of the
group. 9 7 The price and other terms of each contract may be arm's
length, but the large volume of business stably coming from the

Criminal Code, supra note 47, at arts. 355(2), 356; Teuk-jeong Gyeong-je
91.
Beom-joe Ga-jung-cheo-beol Deung-e Gwan-han Beob-ryul [Act on Aggravated Penalties
on Specific Economic Crimes], Act No. 3693, amended by Act No. 15256, art. 3 (S. Kor.).
Criminal Code, supra note 47, at arts. 355(2), 356; Act on Aggravated
92.
Penalties on Specific Economic Crimes, supra note 91, at art. 3.
E.g., Supreme Court [S. CtQ, 2013Do5214, Sept. 26, 2013 (S. Kor.).
93.
This translation was used in Hwa-jin Kim et al., Favoritismand Corporate
94.
Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Hyundai Motor Case, 3 MICE.
Bus. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 41, 51 (2013).
Kyung-Hoon Chun, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine as a Basis for Directors'
95.
Liability: A New Statutory Experiment in Korea, in GERMAN AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES
ON COMPANY LAW 63, 71-72 (Holger Fleischer et al. eds., 2016).
Id. at 72.
96.
97.
Id.
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affiliate companies serves as a great advantage to Company A that its
competitors cannot enjoy. 98 In most cases, Company A, the beneficiary
of such "funneling" practices, is owned by the controlling person of

Group X or the controlling person's close relatives (usually son or
wealth ultimately flows from the
daughter). 99 Thus, the
noncontrolling shareholders of other affiliates to the controlling family,
as illustrated in Figure 3. This practice became widespread in the
2000s among Korean chaebols and caused the Korean public to become
highly skeptical of the chaebol-centric economic structure of Korea. 100
Figure 3

Next Generation
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("N")

100%
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Shareholder

20%

Dispersed
Noncontrolling
Shareholders

80%
Company

Company A

(closed)

B

(listed)
Exclusive supply of
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2. The Glovis Case
The most notable case about funneling involved Hyundai Glovis
Co. (hereinafter "Glovis"), a logistics service company set up within
Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) Group in 2001.101 Its purpose was to
provide its affiliate companies with specialized logistics services such
as the transportation, delivery, and storage of parts, modules, and

completed vehicles. 102 The initial investors of Glovis were the
controlling person of the Group (MK Chung) and his son (ES Chung).1 03
HMC and other affiliates, such as Kia Motors (the second largest
automobile manufacturer in Korea), Hyundai Mobis (the largest auto
part company in Korea), and Hyundai Steel purchased various logistics
services mainly from Glovis. Its revenue and profit dramatically
increased, and its stock was listed on the Korea Exchange in 2005.104

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Hwa-din Kim et aL, supra note 94, at 44.
For an English account of this case, see Chun, supra note 95, at 70-72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The value of Glovis's shares held by MK Chung and ES Chung

increased to almost USD 5 billion by October 2010-a stunning one

10 5
thousand times increase within less than ten years.
The story of Glovis first attracted the attention of the KFTC. After
years of investigation, the KFTC ruled on October 24, 2007, that six
1 06
Undue
counts of undue support had been made within HMC Group.
support for Glovis was one of them, and the penalty imposed on HMC

for supporting Glovis was KRW 4,655 million (the total penalty
imposed on HMC for all six counts of undue support was KRW 50,793
million).107
In the process of investigation and adjudication, however, the
existence of undue support for Glovis was hard to prove because undue
support required substantial deviation from a "normal price," a
10 8
benchmark used to determine whether the transaction was "undue."
In its October 2007 decision, the KFTC found that the undue support
for Glovis in the form of a funneling business only existed from its

inception in March 2001 to June 2004.109 The KFTC stated as follows:
From March 2001 to June 2004, it is acknowledged that excessive economic
profits were provided to Glovis by doing transactions on the terms advantageous
to Clovis . .. Considering that Glovis completed the integrated transportation
system in the first half of 2004 by investment in building logistics depots and
developing information systems, . .. there is insufficient evidence to prove [undue
support for Glovis regardless of the improvement of the logistics services] from
July 2004:110

105. Id. at 70-71. Details of the Glovis case can be found in KFTC, Euigyeol 2007504, Oct. 24, 2007, 67-106 (S. Kor.) (in Korean) (accessible by typing in the case number
at https://case.ftc.go.kr/ocp/colltfr.do [https://perma.cc/9H7B-5MDS] (archived Apr. 23,
2020)). According to this decision, the KFTC found that Glovis received undue support
in the manner of a "funneling business" from HMC, Kia Motors, Mobis, and Hyundai
Steel, by selling the following services: (i) transporting parts between plants, (ii)
delivering completed vehicles from the plant to the exporting harbors or domestic sales
depots, (iii) delivering completed cars from the domestic sales depots to each buyer, (iv)
pre-delivery inspection of vehicles, (v) delivering parts for warranty services from the
logistics centers of Mobis to the repair locations, and (vi) leasing forklifts and other
equipment to the affiliates. Id.
106. KFTC, supra note 105, at 2-3.
107. Id. at 3 and 122.
108. In reviewing undue support cases, the Supreme Court defined the "normal
price" as an arms' length price that would have been applied between nonrelated parties
for a comparable transaction and held that the difference between the normal price and
the actual price was the size of support. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013du4255, June 12,
2014 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2005du3172 Oct. 26, 2007 (S. Kor.); Supreme
Court [S. Ct.], 2004du11268, Dec. 7, 2006 (S. Kor.).
109. KFTC, supra note 105, at 71.
110. Id.
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Although the KFTC's decision on the Glovis issue was generally
supported by the courts,n it had only a limited meaning in regulating
the funneling of business. The KFTC had to prove advantageous terms
such as a higher price than market index-a large volume of
transactions or exclusive dealings between affiliates were deemed
insufficient to find undue support. 112 The volume of transactions
"funneled" to Glovis grew even larger from July 2004 after it began to
operate an integrated transport system, but the KFTC implied that
better services under the improved system would justify the
funneling 1 13 It did not pay any attention to the fact that Glovis, the
beneficiary of the funneling, was owned by two controlling
shareholders of the group. Enhanced efficiency through an integrated
transport system may justify the exclusive dealing with Glovis, but it
does not justify why the owners of Glovis should be the two Chungs

instead of HMC.
This problem relates to the corporate governance of HMC and was

handled as such. In 2008, the minority shareholders of HMC filed a
derivative action against MK Chung (the controlling shareholder of

HMC) and the CEO of HMC. 1 14 The plaintiffs alleged that, among
others, the defendants misappropriated the "corporate opportunity" of

HMC in breach of their duties of loyalty.1 1 5 According to the plaintiffs'
allegation, HMC could have operated the logistics service as an
internal business unit or a new subsidiary, or HMC could have
established Glovis as a joint venture of other affiliates who would have

been faithful customers of Glovis.1 16 If HMC had chosen one of such
alternatives, the shareholders of HMC could have shared the profits." 7
Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that the board of HMC should have
considered such alternatives for the best interest of HMC, and that the
failure of such consideration constituted a breach of fiduciary duties
which in effect transferred economic gains from the noncontrolling
shareholders of HMC to the controlling shareholders. 1 8
To persuade the court with this logic, the plaintiffs invoked the

corporate opportunity doctrine pursuant to US law. They argued that
this doctrine can also be inferred from the general provisions of the

111. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Dul5494, Oct. 25, 2012 (S. Kor.); Seoul High
Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2007Nu30903, Aug. 19, 2009 (S. Kor.).
112. See cases cited supra note 108. Thus, KFTC conducted detailed analyses to
prove that the terms were "advantageous" compared to the "normal" terms of comparable
transactions. KFTC, supra note 105, at 74-90.
113. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
114. Chun, supra note 95, at 71 (ES Chung, the "N" of HMC Group, was not
named as a defendant).
115. Id
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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12 0
under the KCC. On this point,
"duty of care"1 1 9 and "duty of loyalty"

the Seoul District Court ruled against the plaintiffs.

21

Stating that

only "actual and concrete business opportunities existing in the
company" are subject to the prohibition of appropriation, the court
ruled that the establishment of Glovis was not an actual and concrete
22
Since neither
business opportunity that had existed within HMC.1
party appealed this judgment, it became a final one.

3. Statutory Reaction
Two notable statutory reactions were made to the funneling of
business: a new clause on the corporate opportunity doctrine in the
24
KCC12 3 and a new clause on "taking private benefit" in the FTL.1

Article 397-2 of the KCC, which statutorily introduced the
corporate opportunity doctrine, was newly added in 2011.125 According
to this provision, a business opportunity belongs to the company (and
is thus deemed a corporate opportunity) if (a) the opportunity is
actually or potentially profitable to the company, and (b) either (i) a
director became aware of it by use of corporate information or in the
course of performing duties, or (ii) it is closely related to the company's
current or planned business.1 26 If a certain business opportunity is
deemed a corporate one, the director can use that opportunity
personally or for a third party only after disclosing it to, and obtaining
27
The board approval requires
approval from, the board of directors.'
2
and the interested
affirmative votes from two-thirds of all directors,1
29
director must abstain from voting.1

In the United States, a company may resort to constructive trust,
accounting, or other equitable remedies when a corporate opportunity
is improperly exploited by directors or senior executives." Therefore,

119. Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471, amended by Act No. 14965, art. 681 (S.
Kor.); KCC art. 382-2.
120. KCC art. 382(3).
Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2008Gahap47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S.
121.
Kor.). The plaintiff partially won against the defendants only with respect to certain
transactions clearly unfavorable to HMC (and favorable to Glovis).
122.
Id.
123. KCC art. 397(2).
124. FTL art. 23-2.
125. For an English account of this provision, see Chun, supra note 95, at 74-78.
126. The definition is under strong influence of Section 5.05(b) of the AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINcIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 284 (1994).
127. KCC art. 397(2).
128. Id.
129. KCC art. 368(3).
130. Constructive trust was granted in, see, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del, 1939); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522, 528-29 (Mass. 1948).
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the company may claim the earnings that the fiduciary obtained from
the opportunity in violation of the duty without needing to prove the
amount of loss the company actually incurred. In Germany, the
Eintrittsrecht (right to intervene) is sometimes acknowledged as a
remedy for the misappropriation of a corporate opportunity whereby
the company may take the earnings of the fiduciary without need to
prove the company's loss. 13 1 In the process of legislating Article 397-2,
a few experts and congress members proposed remedies such as the
constructive trust or Eintrittsrechtfor disgorgement of profits but faced
opposition. 132 As a compromise, Article 397-2 maintains the
traditional approach of loss compensation, but eased the company's
burden of proof by presuming the gain of a director as the loss of the

company.1 3 3
More controversial than Article 397-2 of the KCC was the new
Article 23-2 of the FTL on "taking private benefit."1 34 It prohibits the
provision of benefits from "a company within a large business group"13 5
(Company) to "members of the controlling family and companies owned

by them" (Beneficiaries), by way of the following: (i) doing transactions
on terms substantially advantageous to the Beneficiary, (ii) granting
to the Beneficiary business opportunities that may be substantially
profitable to the Company, (iii) trading of cash or financial products on
terms substantially advantageous to the Beneficiary, or (iv) doing a
substantial amount of transactions with the Beneficiary without
reasonable consideration of relevant factors or comparison with other
suppliers.136 Funneling of business is covered by items (ii) and (iv).
Violators of this Article are subject to a cease and desist order, 137
administrative monetary penalty up to 5 percent of the relevant
revenue, 1 3 8 and criminal penalty up to three-years' imprisonment.13 9
The most apparent difference between Article 23-2 and the undue
support clause of Article 23(1)(vii) is the scope of application. Article
23-2 applies only to large business groups, while Article 23 applies to

Accounting remedy was granted in, see, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121,
125 (2d Cir. 1934); Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
131. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 8, 1989, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1989, 2687 (Ger.).
132. Disgorgement of profit remedy was proposed in Bill No. 3913, Feb. 24, 2009,
art. 397-2. It was not reflected in the final version of KCC, art. 397(2).
133. Comparatively, it is similar to the Japanese law's approach to a director who
breached the duty to not compete with the company. See Kaishaho [Company Act], art.
423 (Japan).
134. FTL art. 23-2.
135. Currently it applies to a business group of which total assets exceed KRW 5
trillion and for which a controlling natural person is identifiable. Id. at arts. 14(1), 232(1).
136. I at art. 23-2(1).
137. Id. at art. 24.
138. Id. at art. 24-2(4).
139. Id. at art. 66(1)(ix-2).

2020]

MANAGEMENT SUCCESSION IN KOREA

775

any company. 140 Article 23-2 is triggered only when the beneficiary is
"an individual member of the controlling family of the large business
group or "companies in which the controlling family members hold at
least 30% (for listed companies) or 20% (for unlisted companies) of the
total issued shares" 1 4 1 No such restriction exists for Article 23.
Why was Article 23-2 added on top of the undue support clause of
Article 23(1)(vii)? The most important reason was to ease the KFTC's
142
It
burden of proof in regulating the controlling family's tunneling.
the
in
enforcing
"undue-ness"
to
prove
KFTC
the
for
was difficult
undue support clause, because the court interpreted "undue" as
"hindering fair dealing by restricting competition or causing economic
concentration in the market." 4 3 For example, in a famous case where
a listed company provided financial benefits to its controlling family
members (who were natural persons), the Supreme Court ruled that it

did not constitute undue support because there was no evidence that
providing financial benefits to an individual would have negative
impacts on the relevant market.1 4 4 It specifically mentioned that the
"transfer of wealth to the next generation and possible concentration
of economic power" does not by itself lead to "hindering fair
dealings." 145
Thus, the KFTC wanted a new clause regulating related party
transactions without needing to prove negative impacts on competition
in the market, so long as there is a clear transfer of wealth from a
146
Legislative
company to the controlling family without just cause.
documents of the National Assembly for Article 23-2 clearly show that
47
However, as discussed below
the legislators' intent was the same.'
in relation to the tolling, such a legislative intent faced resistance from

the court.' 48

140. Apparent from the language of FTL. Id. at arts. 23 and 23-2.
Id. at arts. 23-2(1) and the Enforcement Decree of FTL, art. 38(2).
141.
142. Yunjeong Kim, T euk-su Gwan-gye-in-e Dae-han Bu-dang-i-ik Je-gongHaengwi Gyu je-eui Beob-jeok Jaeng-jeom-gwa Gae-seon Gwa-je [Issues of and Improvements
for the Regulations on Providing Undue Benefits to Specially Related Persons], 29
GYEONG-JAENG-BEOB YEON-GU [J. KOREAN COMPETITION L.] 80, 85-86 (2014) (S. Kor.);
Lim & Min, supra note 83, at 274.
E.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Du20366, Nov. 13, 2014 (S. Kor.); Supreme
143.
Court [S. Ct.], 2004Du1483, Dec. 22, 2006 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du7220,
Mar. 12, 2004 (S. Kor.).
144. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du6364, Sept. 24, 2004 (S. Kor.) (Samsung SDS
case).
145. Id.
146. Kim, supra note 142, at 86.
147. Id. at 87-88. See also the official reasons for the amendment of FTL (Aug.
13, 2013). Searchable at http://www.law.go.kr/main.html [https://perma.cc/DM5P-3GCT]
(archived Feb. 16, 2020) (in Korean).
148. See infra note 164.

776

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

(VOL. 53:753

4. Re-Reaction and Further
Article 397-2 of the KCC has not been actively invoked since its
introduction in 2011. Few Supreme Court cases have been reported
where the directors or other fiduciaries were held liable for usurping
corporate opportunity. 149 It is not entirely dormant, however, for the
purpose of the internal compliance process-lawyers advise their
corporate clients to take necessary steps under this article regarding
questionable transactions, and the Korean Corporate Governance
Code, a soft law on corporate governance, also implicitly touches upon
this issue.15 0 All in all, reactions of the companies to this article were
not notable.
Reactions to Article 23-2 of FTL were more notable. To avoid
triggering the threshold for being deemed a beneficiary, chaebols often
lowered the family ownership in potential beneficiary companies to
just below 20 percent (for nonlisted firms) or 30 percent (for listed
15 1
firms) and held 19.99 percent or 29.99 percent of the total shares.
The 20 or 30 percent threshold was designed as a bright but arbitrary
cutline to determine whether such a company has the same economic
interests as the controlling family. In substance, having 19.99 percent
ownership and 20.0 percent ownership makes no difference. Also,
chaebols could provide benefits to the subsidiaries of the beneficiaries,
which are literally not within the scope of Article 23-2,152 As a typical
rule-based norm, Article 23-2 was vulnerable to such circumventions.
Against such circumventions, the KFTC tried to strengthen the
rules. Its further amendment proposal drafted and submitted to the
National Assembly in 2018 lowers the threshold percentage to 20

149. A few Supreme Court rulings on this issue rendered after the enactment of
the Article 397-2 were about misconducts committed before the enactment. Thus,
technically, the Article 397-2 could not be applied. See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2016Da16191, Oct. 25, 2018 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Da70044. Sept. 12,
2017 (S. Kor.).
150. KOREAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SERVICE, GI-Eoc JI-BAE-GU-JO MO-BEOM
GYU-JUN [CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE] 25 (2016) (stating directors' duty to avoid
conflict of interest and not to use confidential information of the corporation).
151. The combined shareholding ratio of MK Chung and ES Chung in Glovis (see
supra Part IV.C.2) was 29.999976% (11,249,991 shares out of 37,500,000 shares) as of
September 30, 2019. See DART, http://dart.fss.or.kr/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/ET2E-PQBE] (archived Feb. 17, 2020) (in Korean). The combined
shareholding ratio of the LG Group's controlling family members in Pantos (LG Group's
logistics service company) was 19.9% (398,000 shares out of 2,000,000 shares) and such
shares
were
sold
to
outside
purchasers
in
2018.
See
HANKYUNG,
https://www.hankyung.com/finance/article/2018100430411 (last visited Mar. 18, 2020)
[https:/perma.cc/4557-DSWW] (archived February 17, 2020) (in Korean). Similar
examples are plentiful in smaller business groups although reliable statistics are not
available.
152. Reliable data is not available on this point, but KFTC expressed concern
about such a practice when it proposed the amendment to FTL in 2018. See infra note
154.
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153
as
percent in listed firms and includes such firm's subsidiaries
15 4
Such a rule-based approach, however, always leaves
beneficiaries.
loopholes-for example, the controlling family's ownership may be kept
at 19.99 percent in listed firms and any benefits can be provided to the

sub-subsidiary of the original beneficiary. As of March 2020, this
proposal is pending at the National Assembly.

D. Circumvention #2: Tolling

So-called tolling is another practice that appeared instead of
classic tunneling by way of a related party transaction. When group
companies buy or sell services or materials, they often do it through a
conduit company usually owned by N and drop some margins or
commissions there.1 5 5 As illustrated in Figure 4, Company B buys
goods or services from the supplier through a vehicle owned by N, and
sells goods or services to the customers through another vehicle owned
by N.
Figure 4
Contro ling
Sharehoder

Naxt Generation
Members
(N")

20%

100%

Customer
Supplier

$102

Company A
(dcosed)

100

roptr
Nncontrolbg

Shreholder
80%

Company B
(listed)

It is a relatively small but a useful and stable source of income for
N. It has been hard to challenge this practice as a breach of fiduciary
duty because Company B may justify the deal structure as a business
judgment. For example, one may argue that Company A's role is
coordinating the group's purchase activities, taking care of
administrative chores for purchasing, or handling customers'
complaints as an intermediary. Assuming that Company A has a role
positive to Company B's interest, even if such a role is insignificant or
almost ignorable, it would not be easy to prove a breach of Company B

Defined as a company in which the parent company holds more than 50% of
153.
the total issued shares.
154. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Common Draft of Complete Amendment
to Fair Trade Law Passes the Cabinet (Nov. 27, 2018).
155. Lim & Min, supra note 83, at 273-74.
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director's fiduciary duty and the amount of loss incurred by Company

B. Presumably on that ground, civil and criminal liability for tolling
has rarely been sought. Whether tolling can be regulated as undue

support under the FTL was not clear either, because it was difficult in
this circumstance to prove the size of support which is the difference
between the "(hypothetical) normal price" and the "actual price

paid."15 6
Two provisions were added to the FTL as a statutory reaction.

First, in 2013, tolling was specified as an additional type of undue
support.15 7 It is defined as "an act of transacting with a counterparty
through an intermediary which is the actor's specially related person
or another company that has no substantive role in the transaction,
despite the substantial benefits of directly transacting with the
counterparty."15 8 Second, in the same amendment, Article 23-2 was
introduced as discussed above to regulate "private-benefit seeking"

within a large business group.15 9 Tolling was one of its targets. 1 60
In 2017, based on Article 23-2, the KFTC imposed penalties on
certain transactions within Korea Air Group, including a tolling where
a conduit vehicle owned by the descendants of the controlling

shareholder took excessive commissions. 16 1 According to the KFTC
decision, Article 23-2 is applicable to the transfer of undue profit from
the company to the controlling family by way of tolling "unless there
are reasonable grounds for doing so,"162 without need to prove any
negative impact on the competition in the relevant market or other
concern for "hindering fair dealing."16 3
The Seoul High Court, however, overruled the KFTC's decision 164
The court ruled that Article 23-2 also requires "undue-ness," which,
according to the court, means "a concern that economic power would be
concentrated through private-benefit seeking."16 5 The court did not
find such an effect in this case because the proved tolling amount was
too small to affect the level of competition or economic concentration in

the relevant market. 1 66 The court also stated that the "normal price"

156.
See supra note 108; for the standard established by the Korean Supreme
Court in calculating the size of support.
157. FTL art. 23(1)(vii)(b).
158. Id.
159.
See supra Part IV. C.3.
160.
See infra note 161.
161. KFTC, Euigyeol 2017-009, Jan 10, 2017 (S. Kor.),
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id. at 48 (stating that the tolling activities at hand did violate Article 23-2
but did not violate Article 23(1) due to lack of negative impact on the competition in the
relevant market).

164.
165.
166.

Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2017Nu36153, Sept. 1, 2017 (S. Kor.).

Id.
Id.
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should be identified as a benchmark in determining whether the terms
67
were substantially advantageous as provided in Article 23-2(1)(i).1
It would be fair to say that the court tried to honor the Supreme
Court precedents that have been formed regarding Article 23 for
doctrinal consistency even when the new Article 23-2 was invoked. The
court ruling was apparently against the legislative intent of Article 232 because it still required the KFTC to prove the "normal price" and
the impact on the market, such as "concern for concentration of
economic power." 16 8 It caused (or reaffirmed) significant difficulty in

enforcing Article 23-2. Although the case is currently pending at the
Supreme Court as of April 2020, certain congress members are trying
to amend the FTL again to clarify that "effect on the market" is not an
element in Article 23-2, or at least to switch the burden of proof
69
regarding "undue-ness."1

V. HORIZONTAL CORPORATE DIVISION
The practices examined thus far generally fall under the typical
types of tunneling. A horizontal corporate division, which has been
popular among Korean companies and often helped increase N's
shares, is harder to characterize as tunneling in a conventional

meaning.1 7 0
Division means an act of separating a part of a corporation by
shareholders' resolution.1 71 Division is classified as "simple-division

1 2
vs. division-merger" and "horizontal division vs. vertical division," 7
and these two pairs make four combinations. Simple-division turns the

167.
Id.
168. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
For instance, a seminar was held by Congressman HC Jeon regarding the
169.
amendment of Article 23-2 on September 3, 2019 with the presence of several legal and
finance experts.
170. See Woojin Kim & Shu-Feng Wang, Free Lunches for Insiders under Investor
(2015),
Arbitrage
Limited
and
Inertia
http://www.fmaconferences.org/Sydney/Papers/KimWang20151124.pdf
[https-/perma,cc/8RWX-6ZSV] (archived Feb. 16, 2020) (analyzing how investor inertia
benefits the controlling families of business groups through spin-offs followed by stockfor-stock tender offers in business group in Korea and stating that it is distinct from
explicit tunneling or diversion of resources).
171. A spin-off or split-off may sound more familiar to US lawyers - "division" is
the legal jargon used in EU Directives to describe this event. See Council Directive
2017/1132, 2017 O.J. (L 169) 46 (EU). Since the division regime under the KCC was
created in 1998 under the strong influence of (and is similar to) continental European
law, this Article uses the term "division.
172. Direct translations of horizontal division (in-jeok-bunhal in Korean) and
vertical division (mul-jeok-bun-hal in Korean) are 'division in person' and 'division in
rem,' which indicate to whom the new shares of the new spun-off company are issued.
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separated part into a new stand-alone company, while division-merger
turns the separated part into a part of another company.' 7 3 Shares of
the new company (or a new part of another company) that represent

the value of the separated part of the original company belong to the
original company in a vertical division, while such shares belong to the
shareholders of the original company in a horizontal division.17 4
Figure 5 illustrates a horizontal division where Company X is

divided into Companies X and Y that have the same owners. Horizontal
division has often been used to adopt a holding company structure. 175
If Company X plans to be a holding company of the group, the division
plan will allocate investments in other affiliates to the post-division

Company X and substantive operations to the new Company Y.
Then Company X launches a tender offer to Company Y's
shareholders in exchange for new shares issued by Company X. The
exchange ratio is determined according to a regulatory formula based
on the prevailing market prices of the two firms. Among Company Y's
shareholders, members of the controlling family ("a" and "b" in the

illustration) usually tender their shares in accordance with their plan
and become shareholders of Company X, but other unrelated
shareholders ("c" in the illustration) usually remain passive and do not
tender their shares. Such "inertia" may seem rational because the

investors have little reason to own the holding company shares instead
of having the discretion to own or not own each subsidiary's shares. In
addition, the market price of Company X shares is usually undervalued
because of the phenomenon known as the "holding company discount."
Therefore, family members receive a relatively higher ratio in
Company X as a result of the exchange. Now Figure 6 shows that
(a+b)'s control over the group (X+Y) is stronger than their control over
pre-division Company X.

KCC art. 530-2
174. Id. at arts. 530-5(1)(iv) (for a horizontal division), 530-12 (for a vertical
division). See also KIM ET AL., supra note 59, at 782.
175. Kim & Wang, supra note 170, at 2-3.
173.
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Figure 6
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If Company X had treasury shares before the division, and if new

shares of Company Y were allotted to the treasury shares as well (as if
they were outstanding shares of Company X), the structure will be like
Figure 7. In this picture, Company X's treasury shares are indicated as
"X's ownership in X" with no voting right. Upon horizontal division,
shares of Company Y are issued to the shareholders of Company X. If

Company Y issues new shares to Company X as well (under the
understanding that Company X is its own shareholder for the treasury

shares), then Company X will have voting shares in Company Y. In
effect, after the division, the voting right of the treasury shares
resurrects partially with respect to Company Y. The family members
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(a+b) now have leveraged control over Company Y through Company

X.
Figure 7
b

c
X (no voting)

x

E

X

X (no vote)

c

votinig!

If the "exchange tender offer" and the "allotment of new shares to

the treasury shares" are combined, (a+b)'s control over (X+Y) becomes
much stronger as Figure 8 illustrates. If we simply count the number

of arrows in the diagram, (a+b) had 2/3 votes over predivision Company
X but finally have 4/5 votes over postdivision Company X and control
3/4 votes over Company Y through Company X. If a and b are the Ns,
this is a very efficient and clever measure to increase their control over
the entire group.

Figure 8
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x (no vote)
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This is often called the "magic of treasury stock" in Korea,1 7 6 but
the trick is simple. Allotment of new shares of Company Y to the
treasury shares of Company X is in effect the same as distributing
Company X's dividends to Company X itself. Horizontal division is

176.

See e.g., SANG-N PARK, supra note 26, at 196-98.
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economically the same as vertical division (where the new shares of
Company Y belong to Company X) followed by Company X's
distribution of Company Y shares as in-kind dividends. Company X
cannot receive such dividends (Company Y shares) even with respect
to its own shares. Likewise, Company X should not receive Company
Y's new shares at the time of horizontal division.
Certain scholars and shareholder activists pointed out the
absurdity of this "magic" and argued against this practice,177 but to
the author's knowledge such deals have never been challenged by the
courts, either in a civil, criminal, or administrative case. In 2016 and
2017, certain congress members proposed an amendment to the KCC
that prohibits "allotment of new shares to the treasury stock of the
178
Although very
original company" at the time of horizontal division.
technical in nature, this issue also caught political nuance and is now
awaiting discussion at the National Assembly.

VI. CONCLUSION
The controlling shareholders and the management of Korean
companies designed clever measures to facilitate management
succession, often by circumventing the current rules. The passive
judiciary, the rule-oriented legal culture, and the widespread
textualism among Korean lawyers and legal scholars prompted the
need for statutory reactions to address the resulting problems.
Statutory reactions, however, were sometimes late, limited, or
irrelevant. These stories may have some implications for a comparative

study of corporate law.
First, the cases discussed in this Article provide an opportunity to
observe the classic trade-offs of rules and standards in the real

corporate world.1 79 Rules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or
180
Rules
bias, but may suppress relevant similarities and differences.
afford certainty and predictability, but tend toward obsolescence and
absurd rigidity.' 8 1 Rules reduce chances for rent seeking and agency
problems, but are vulnerable to circumvention and avoidance-they
"allow the bad man to engage in socially unproductive behavior right

177. See, e.g., Hyeok-Joon Roh, Gi-eop-jae-pyeon-eui Hwal-seong-hwa-wa Gue
Dilemma [A Step Towards Business Iriendly M&A Rules and Its Dilemma], 34-3 SANGsA-BEoB YEON-GU [COM. L, REV.] 67, 76-78 (2015) (S. Kor.).
178. Bill No. 837, July 12, 2016; Bill No. 5633, Feb. 14, 2017.
179. For various arguments for rules and standards, see Kathleen Sullivan, The
Justices of lules and Standards, 106 HARvy L. REV. 22, 62-69 (1992).
180. Id. at 62, 66.
181. Id.
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up to the line. 1 8 2 In the cases discussed in this Article, the rule-based
approaches revealed their well-known limits. Preemptive rights that
should be granted to the existing shareholders in case of issuing new
shares were circumvented by reissuing forfeited shares or selling
treasury shares. 1 83 Rules that determine the scope of the beneficiary

under Article 23-2 of the FTL were avoided by decreasing the
controlling family's shareholding ratio just below the thresholds or by
adding another layer of subsidiary. 184 The undue support clause was
toothless when the formula of "the difference from the normal price"
was incalculable as in the "funneling of business" or the tolling. 185 In
these cases, supplementary or concurrent use of standards such as
directors' fiduciary duties would have been effective.
Second, the cases discussed in this Article also provide an
opportunity to examine the traditional dichotomy between statutes
and case law in the context of corporate law. Unlike case law formed
by judges, statutes are the products of political processes in a
democratic jurisdiction. Once the corporate law issues are handled in
the parliament as a part of the political decision-making process, the
bills tend to represent partisan interests and may be subject to political
give-and-take with other agendas, including totally unrelated ones.
Thus, the final products (i.e., the statutes) may have more political
legitimacy but are often suboptimal in substance. In the cases
discussed in this Article, reasonable proposals such as treating a sale
of treasury shares in the same manner as issuance of new shares or
barring allotment of new shares to the treasury shares in a horizontal

division faced opposition from the conservative party and failed to be
made into the statutes. 186 Likewise, reasonable proposals such as
introduction of poison pills faced opposition from the progressive party
and failed to survive the process for the amendment of the KCC. 18 7
Had judges addressed such issues in an individual court case, the
inefficiency of overpoliticization could have been avoided.
Third, as a related matter, the cases discussed in this Article shed
light on the roles of the judiciary in the context of corporate law. Active
courts and passive courts have their own pros and cons, as debated for
centuries in the literature of political science and constitutional law. 188

In the cases discussed in this Article, the formalistic and faithful-to-

182.
183.

Id. at 63.
See supra Parts ilI.C, IILD.
184. See supra Part IV.C.4.
185. See supra Parts IV.C.3 (in particular, note 108 and accompanying text), IV.D
(in particular, note 168 and accompanying text).
186. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (for the sale of treasury
shares); supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (for treasury shares in a horizontal
division).
187. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., various literatures cited in Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and
Current Meaning of "JudicialActivism"; 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441 (2004).
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the-letter attitudes of the Korean courts brought too many corporate
law issues to the legislature and prompted the overpoliticization of
those issues. It was often argued that the passive courts fail to protect
the liberty and human rights of the citizens from state power, and the
cases discussed in this Article imply that the passive courts may also
cause negative impacts on corporate law by tossing to the legislature
corporate law issues that are more suitable for a judiciary problem-

solving process rather than for a political decision-making process.

***

